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The objective of this paper is to outline various possible housing
policies to combat depression and to raise questions for further ex-
ploration, rather than to recommend specific actions.
The mere fact that housing policies are included in this sympo-
sium on policies to combat depression illustrates a significant de-
velopment. The establishment of the Federal Home Loan Bank
System, the mortgage insurance program of the Federal Housing
Administration and mortgage guarantee program of the Veterans'
Administration, a government-owned secondary mortgage lending
facility (the Federal National Mortgage Association), and federally
supported public housing and urban redevelopment programs cre-
ated instrumentalities which it is widely believed can be used for
purposes of economic stabilization.
All of these instrumentalities are products of the past twenty years
or so. Their potentials in economic stabilization programs are uncer-
tain and untested, but there is fairly general agreement that they
can influence and modify the market forces operating on the volume
of residential construction and, indirectly, of nonresidential con-
struction usually associated with house building. There is much less
certainty about the extent and implications of their influence.
The principle of meshing housing policies with general economic
stabilization policies has slowly gained recognition. It was embodied
in several provisions of the Housing Act of It was put into
This paper was originally drafted in the fall of 1953 and was revised in June
1954. Legislative and other changes since that time have not been taken into
account. The opinions expressed in this paper are exclusively those of the author
and do not in any way necessarily represent the views of any organization with
which he has been or is now associated.
1Section102(e) of the act stipulates that the annual amount of the federal
notes and obligations authorized for loans to local public agencies for urban re-
development may be increased by specified amounts "upon a determination by
the President, after receiving advice from the Council of Economic Advisers as
to the general effect of such increase upon the conditions in the building industry
and upon the national economy, that such action is in the public interest." Section
304 ( a) of the act èontains identical language in regard to the maximum amount
of annual contributions which the Public Housing Authority is authorized to
contract for with local housing authorities. Public Law 171, 81st Cong.
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practice after the outbreak of the Korean hostilities when mortgage
credit was restricted by the institution of Regulation X and accom-
panying limitations on FHA- and VA-insured loans. It was expressed
in the Housing Amendments of 1953 which gave the President
stand-by authority to liberalize FHA maximum terms. A further
extension of the principle is found in the President's Housing Mes-
sage and Economic Report of January 1954, which propose execu-
tive authority to vary, within certain limitations, the maximum
terms for both VA and FHA mortgage loans.
Some quantitative relationships may help define the potential
role of housing policies in economic stabilization programs:
1. Expenditures for new housekeeping residential construction
(inclusive of additions and alterations) in the postwar period 1946—
1953 equaled 36.2 per cent of total new construction expenditures
and 20.5 per cent of gross private domestic investment.
2. The ratio of residential construction expenditures to total gross
capital formation (Kuznets' definition) has shown a secular decline
at least since 1890. In five-year moving averages in 1929 prices, the
ratio fell from about 30 per cent i.n the nineties to about 25 per cent
in the twenties and about 13 per cent in 1950.
3. The residential mortgage debt in 1952 was 45 per cent of the
total net private long-term debt and exceeded net corporate long-
term debt. This percentage was only 16 in 1900 and roughly 30 in
both 1929 and 1939.
4. From 1946 to 1953, about 43 per cent of all privately financed
new dwelling units were acquired with loans insured by the Fed-
eral Housing Administration or guaranteed by the Veterans' Ad-
ministration.
5. The estimated balance outstanding of FHA and VA loans at
the end of 1952 approximated 40 per cent of the aggregate residen-
tial mortgage debt.
6. Under the low rent public housing programs of the federal
government, about 400,000 dwelling units were completed from
1937 to 1953 or were under construction at the end of 1953 (ex-
clusive of war housing). The largest annual volume during the
postwar period (in 1951) was roughly 7 per cent of all new non-
f arm dwelling units started.2
Housing policies to combat depression include federal aids in-
2Fordata on the quantitative importance of government housing programs
see Leo Grebler, The Role of Federal Credit Aids in Residential Construction,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 39, 1953. Other data
in this section are from a forthcoming monograph by Leo Crebler, David M. Blank,
and Louis Winnick, Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate: Trends and
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volving primarily transfer payments as well as expenditures oper-
ating directly on income and employment. Federal aid in this field
is not limited to measures having an income-producing effect. Trans-
fer payments may be necessary to relieve financial distress and are
required by legal obligations in FHA insurance and VA guarantee
of mortgages. Consequently, these five types of policies are con-
sidered in this paper:
L Financial operations"
2. Financial rescue operations
8. Stimulation of newresidentialconstruction
4. Stimulation of repairs and modernization
5. Aids to slum clearance and redevelopment
Transfer payments are involved in 1 and 2 and partly in 5.Income-
producing expenditures are involved in 8 and 4 and partly in 5.
The applicability and effectiveness of each of the above policies
and of various combinations of them will depend upon, among other
things, the specific characteristics of a depression. For the purpose
of this essay, four situations are envisaged:
1. A decline in rents, house prices, and residential construction
without appreciable decline in general business activity for
some considerable period of time. The 1926—1929 period is per-
haps the closest historical example of this situation.
2. A short but possibly sharp business recession, of the 1920—1921
or the 1949 variety.
3. A long, moderate depression of general character involving
widespread (rather than localized) unemployment.
4. A long, severe depression of general character, as above.
Any such classification raises, of course, questions of definition
and diagnosis, which cannot be discussed in this paper. In addition,
specific conditions in housing and mortgage markets would have a
bearing on the desirability and timing of various courses of ac-
lion. Some of the additional information needed to diagnose con-
ditions in housing and mortgage markets is outlined in the Ap-
pendix.
Policies to combat a sector depression of type 1 would be important
primarily because of cumulative effects on the economy, although
these may be delayed, particularly if other types of building con-
struction hold up well.
The following questions would have to be raised in connection
with a type 1 depression:
Prospects, Princeton University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research1
in press.
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Is this situation worth considering? And if so, would intensi-
fied government aids to housing be warranted? Or would
such aids serve only to delay the reduction of specific malad-
justments in the housing market? Declining occupancy,
rents, and house prices will produce financial difficulties. Is
it reasonable to expect that the difficulties will not be of
sufficient magnitude to call for financial "holding" opera-
tions other than those involved in existing FHA insurance
and VA guarantee of mortgages?
As to depression type 2, many of the housing policies of an in-
come-producing character would be ineffective in a short business de-
cline or, for that matter, in the first stage of a longer decline.
The time lag between legislation or regulation and execution is
long, particularly when new programs (rather than modifications of
existing programs) are involved. For example, Congressional adop-
tion of the first major public housing program in 1937 was induced
partly by the recession of that year. But the recession was over be-
fore the first foundation of any housing project under the United
States Housing Act of 1937 was dug. Stimulation of repairs and
modernization, which could operate fairly rapidly, is likely to be
more immediately effective than any measure to raise the level of
new construction. The main problem of public policy in this situation
will be to resist pressures for new or intensified programs which
must be judged on other merits, rather than on their effectiveness in
dealing with a short recession or the first stage of any recession.
For the purpose of this paper it is assumed that housing programs
will be used primarily as means to combat depressions of type S
(long but mild) as well as type 4 (long and severe). The difference
would lie solely in the admixture of policies and in the scope and
intensity of programs. All of these policies might be appropriate
ingredients for both types of long depression—except for financial
rescue operations, which would be required only in the case of
a severe depression, if at all. To clarify this point, the next few
paragraphs discuss the need for, and content of, "financial holding"
vs. "financial rescue" operations.
Financial Holding and Rescue Operations
Any substantial and fairly general decline in economic activity
will create financial difficulties in the housing field. Home owners
and owners of rental housing will default on mortgages. The fed-
eral government will be involved directly through its potential
contingent liabilities in FHA insurance and VA guarantee. The
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following considerations are relevant to an appraisal of the need
for financial holding or rescue operations:
1. Because of the massive volume of new mortgage lending
associated with the postwar building and real estate boom, a large
proportion of residential mortgages now outstanding are unseasoned
loans. More than four-fifths of the residential mortgages outstanding
in 1950 were originated or assumed after the beginning of 1946,
and roughly one of every eight home mortgages in 1950 was 80
per cent or more of the estimated property value. The present ratio
of unseasoned loans is probably not lower and may be higher.
2. Many recent home purchasers having high-percentage home
loans probably also have large debt obligations on consumer dura-
bles.
3. Like earlier housing booms, the postwar boom has been associ-
ated with overcommitments by certain numbers of home purchasers
in relation to their current and prospective incomes.
4. Measures to stimulate business activity may not operate with
sufficient rapidity or effectiveness to relieve financial distress.
These points emphasize the need for financial "holding opera-
tions" in a long depression even of moderate dimensions. For per-
spective, it is important to add that in 1950 less than half the
owner-occupied homes were mortgaged, and that the median ratio
of debt to value of the mortgaged homes was only 42 per cent.
Also, since most residential mortgage loans are on a regular amor-
tization schedule, the difficulties arising from inability to renew
straight loans will be avoided or minimized. Nevertheless, there
will be a large enough number of borrowers unable to meet pay-
ments on unseasoned high-percentage loans to produce trouble.
The debt-to-value ratio deteriorates rapidly when real estate prices
fall and unpaid debt charges accumulate.
Financial holding operations may include:
1. Temporary waiver of amortization (complete or partial) or
rewriting of loans for longer maturities, depending on borrowers'
circumstances. In the case of FHA and VA loans these steps would
require sanction by the agencies through regulation without new
legislation. In the case of conventional loans the approach would be
to encourage financial institutions to waive amortization or rewrite
loans and to assure sanction. of these measures by federal and state
supervisory authorities.3 Waiver of amortization will, of course,
reduce the flow of funds into financial institutions, but so would
This is important. There have been cases in the past in which federal agencies
encouraged a given policy, but institutions found themselves critiôized by federal
as well as state examiners for adopting it.
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foreclosures. Looking back over the thirties, one wonders whether
mortgagees as well as mortgagors would not have been better off
if lenders had "played along" with many of the borrowers who went
through foreclosure. The case for "playing along" is strengthened
by the difficulties of mass foreclosures against veterans. Waiver of
amortization will also minimize the tendency of borrowers to
"walk out" on the mortgagee and rent or buy more cheaply some-
where else. Consideration must be given to consistent criteria for
waiver, at least for FHA and VA loans. Because of the absence of
home-ownership motivation and the possibilitiesof "milking"
properties, great discrimination will be required in the case of rental
housing.
2. Expansion of advances of Home Loan Banks to member insti-
tutions to improve their liquidity position. If the banks have difficulty
in selling their debentures in the capital market, the Secretary of
the Treasury's authority to buy the banks' obligations would be
used and perhaps expanded. This measure will be operative pri-
marily for savings and loan associations. Few institutions of other
types are members of the Home Loan Bank System.
3. Expansion of the purchase program of the Federal National
Mortgage Association for FHA and VA loans in good standing,
to improve the liquidity position of institutional leaders. In such
action, purchase at discount would be carefully considered to pre-
vent wholesale dumping of loans by financial institutions. As an
alternative to purchase, and one that is preferable in many re-
spects, the FNMA may be authorized to make loans to financial
institutions on the security of FHA and VA mortgages.4
4. Use of existing emergency authority of the Federal Reserve
banks for discounting of or loaning on mortgages, particularly con-
ventional mortgages.
This outline of financial holding operations assumes that in view
of the insurance of bank deposits and savings and loan shares, no
general runs on financial institutions will develop. The absence of
general runs on financial institutions should make it possible for
mortgagees to minimize resort to foreclosure and should act as a
brake on any tendency of institutions to exchange VA and FHA
loans in default for cash (in the case of VA) or for debentures con-
vertible into cash (in the case of FHA).
There is a great deal of discussion on the establishment of a truly compre-
hensive secondary mortgage bank system, in lieu of or in addition to the FNMA
and possibly incorporating the Home Loan Bank System. If such a system ex-
isted at the time of action, it could perform the above function with special
government aid.
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Even in the case of a severe, long depression (type 4), it is this
writer's hope that financial rescue operations can be avoided and
that a combination of "holding operations" and of positive measures
to sustain general income and employment, if taken in time, will
make major rescue operations unnecessary. Mass financial difficul-
ties in the mortgage market are typically delayed, and preventive
medicine has a good chance to be effective in time. Also, difficulties
of this kind are symptoms of the disease rather than the disease
itself.
The need for another Home Owners' Loan Corporation is re-
duced by the insurance and the guarantee program of the FHA and
the VA, respectively, which practically involve HOLC's of their
own. The problem here is to devise consistent and noncompetitive
policies as to resale, renting, and pricing of properties taken over
by the two agencies, so as to avoid further deterioration of the real
estate market.
In an emergency, consideration may be given to •authorizing
the FHA to take over directly home mortgages with specified de-
faults, without the mortgagee being required to foreclose. This
procedure is now used for VA loans at the option of the Administra-
tor of Veterans' Affairs and has the advantage of permitting a gov-
ernment agency capable of setting uniform policies to make de-
cisions affecting the borrower.
As to conventional mortgages in default, the measures outlined
earlier—viz, the temporary waiver of amortization, expansion of
Home Loan Bank advances, and mortgage loan discounts by the
Federal Reserve banks—combined with general policies to sustain
income and employment, should minimize the need for another
HOLC.
Stimulation of New Residential Construction
Turning to income-producing aids to housing, there is a general
problem of choosing criteria for determining the place of housing
programs as against the place of general monetary and fiscal meas-
ures and of public works. From a housing point of view, any sig-
nificant decline in general business and construction activity ap-
pears to liberate resources that can be used for the advancement of
worthwhile housing objectives. From the point of view of the best
strategy in combating a depression, the effectiveness of government
aids for housing, relative to that of other policies, is less clear.
Clarification is perhaps more important for decisions in connection
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with a long but mild depression than for those in connection with
a long and severe depression, on the ground that measures to combat
the former can and should be more selective.
QUERIES
Do we know enough about criteria such as effectiveness in
obtaining any results, speed of results, multiplier effects?
Even if some housing programs, such as slum clearance,
should rank low on economic criteria, they might rank high
in terms of community benefits. How can these benefits be
equated with strictly economic criteria of effectiveness?
Stimulation of new residential construction may be approached
in various ways, of which the following are here considered:
1. Within the framework of FHA and VA programs (more liberal
terms and/or more liberal insurance and guarantees)
2. Direct federal loans on new owner-occupied houses and new
privately sponsored rental housing
3. Tax incentives
4. A new or intensified public housing program
Any attempt to stimulate new residential construction through
modification of FHA and VA programs will start with a severe
handicap: The ammunition of liberal terms has been largely shot
away during the postwar boom, and there is comparatively little
left. The possibilities of stimulating construction through more
liberal financing terms under the FHA and VA would be far greater
if we entered a depression with a more conservative pattern of
maximum terms. But this statement is almost theoretical today.
Assuming that rates must fall into a pattern making FHA
and VA loans attractive to financial institutions,, the three "handles"
for stimulation of demand. are higher mortgage ceilings, lower
minimum downpayments, and longer maximum contract terms.
Higher ceilings for FHA mortgage loans and VA guarantees, which
make larger loans and higher-priced houses eligible for government
aid, would probably have small effects on the demand for residential
construction in a period of declining employment and growing un-
certainty. As to lower minimum downpayments, there is some lee-
way under the FHA program but none under the VA program with
its 100 per cent maximum loans. The present maximum maturities,
25to30 years for FHA and VA home loans and 30 to 40 years for
FHA rental housing and cooperative housing loans, can theoreti-
cally be extended. But the effect on borrowers' monthly payments
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and therefore on demand would be relatively small unless extreme
maturities, probably unacceptable to financial institutions, were
contemplated. Moreover, the percentage reduction of periodic
ownership outlays (or rent) is roughly but half the percentage
reduction of debt payments associated with more liberal terms.
More liberal terms do not affect real estate taxes, maintenance and
repair, and similar operating costs.
Some leeway may exist even within the present framework of
maximum terms. In the past few years the FHA and VA, as well
as lending institutions, in many cases did not apply maximum terms.
As a result, average terms have been substantially less liberal than
maximUm terms. In a buyers' market, maximum terms might be ap.-
plied to a larger percentage of cases without seriously lowering
underwriting standards.
New legislation could permit loans to be written on the basis of
partial rather than full amortization, that is, the amortization sched-
ule would provide for repayment of, say, 50percent of the mortgage
principal within a given maturity of the loan. This step, however,
would be a radical departure from the principle of full amortization
and would dilute one of the few lasting reforms of our mortgage debt
structure.
The effectiveness of the mild doses of credit liberalization still
left under the FHA and VA programs must be considered quite
uncertain. The price elasticity of housing demand (including mort-
gage loan terms) probably is quite iow. Reluctance of consumers
to enter into long-term commitments even at more favorable terms
will be great when incomes decline or are uncertain. Under such
conditions many bargains in existing housing will compete with
new construction. These uncertainties must be taken into account
in weighing the effectiveness of more liberal FHA and VA terms
against the effectiveness of other policies (such as business or per-
sonal income tax policies, public works, or public housing).
In addition to stimulating borrowing, there may be need for
stimulating lending under the FHA and VA programs. "Apart from
higher interest rates there is little leeway left for making invest-
ments in insured or guaranteed mortgages more attractive under
unfavorable business conditions. Further inducements might be
covering more or all of the risks still left with the mortgagee (such
as the excess of foreclosure costs over the maximum covered by
FHA and liberalization of the "waste provisions" under which the
mortgagee bears the risk of unusual damage to property after insti-
tution of foreclosure proceedings), or in making the interest rate
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and terms of FHA debentures exchanged for foreclosed properties
more attractive. In the case of VA loans, the maximum amounts
and percentages of the guaranty could again be raised. The effec-
tiveness of these inducements must be weighed against the con-
ditions that would create caution and reluctance in lending on
new construction."
In summary, liberalization of loan terms and loan insurance pro..
visions under the FHA and VA programs would stimulate new
construction only mildly. To give a crude and blunt illustration,
these methods would probably be insufficient to raise the level of
housing starts more than 10 to 15 per cent over the volume that
would obtain without them.
Under conditions of declining employment, public demands will
unquestionably develop for "stronger medicine" in the way of
federal credit aids. While many "schemes" will be proposed, de-
mands for direct use of public credit for privately owned new hous-
ing are probably the most realistic ones to contemplate. The prece-
dents of the HOLC, of direct VA loans for home purchase, of the
use of the FNMA as a primary source of funds, of the Connecticut
and other state programs for veterans' housing, and of New York
City's non-cash-subsidy public housing program point in this direc-
tion. Quite apart from interest rates, the downpayments, borrowers'
credit ratings, and maturities in public lending programs could be
adjusted to a degree of liberality not acceptable to portfolio lenders
even with FHA or VA protection.
The use of public credit could be compatible with pro forma
maintenance of the institutional framework of private building and
mortgage servicing operations, as under a program using the FNMA
as a primary source of funds. Or it could be executed as a direct
federal agency operation similar to that of the HOLC. Credit terms,
and therefore much of the effectiveness of a program, would depend
on whether or not the operation were designed to be self-liquidating.
If it were, assuming a going federal long-term interest rate of 21/2
to S per cent, the contract interest rate might be 3 to 4 per cent.
Even though such a rate might not be much lower than the rate
for FHA and VA loans, the case for public credit would rest on
an "insufficient" volume of credit for new construction at the going
terms for FHA and VA loans or conventional loans. If designed as
a non-self-liquidating operation, the interest rate could, of course,
be lower.
Grebler, op.cit., p. 61.
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In spite of the precedents mentioned earlier, the substantial use
of public credit would be a radical departure from past institu-
tional arrangements. If a public lending program should be insti-
tuted as a countercyclical device, it would be most difficult to with-
draw it when it was no longer needed for countercyclical purposes.
Such a program has long-run implications exemplified by the pa-
ralysis in the flow of private capital into residential real estate in
some of the European countries, where there is a real question
whether the total flow of funds into this field in the long run has
been augmented or diminished by injection of public credit. These
observations do not necessarily argue against the use of public
credit for specific long-term programs of social betterment. They
do argue against sliding into permanent public financing through
the back door of temporary countercyclical measures.
Among the many problems associated with public credit is the
establishment of standards for its use. Upper limits on appraised
values and mortgage loans (and on rents in the case of rental hous-
ing) would be one approach. More direct "need tests" or demon-
stration of the unavailability of private credit would be another.
But it is easy to foresee the pressures for more liberal standards no
matter how the standards are designed originally.
QUERIES
In view of these difficulties, should the use of public credit
be reserved for a long depression of great severity? What
should be the objective of standards? Maximizing the vol-
ume of housing construction? Limiting public credit to
housing for certain income groups, defined in what fashion?
In view of the limited possibilities of stimulating new construc-
tion through the FHA and VA programs and of the problems in-
volved in the use of public credit, it is perhaps appropriate to con-
sider stimulation of new housing construction through means other
than debt financing, which has been ridden so hard during the
past twenty years.
QUERIES
How can equity financing supplemented by conservative
mortgage financing be encouraged (1) for rental builders
and (2) for owner occupants? Low income tax rates for
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rental housing corporations conforming to certain opera-
tional standards? Accelerated depreciation and/or permis-
sion to carry loss deductions for rental projects over longer
periods? Deduction from current taxable income of a por-
tion of equity investment in new houses by owner occu-
pants? Are these devices possible legally, tolerable from a
fiscal point of view, and promising as to effectiveness? 6
Interrelationshipsbetween the markets for new and existing
housing must be considered in any program of easier credit for
new construction. These interrelationships limit the extent to which
mortgage loan terms on new and existing construction can be
differentiated. If new construction is pushed too hard, it will be more
difficult to maintain an orderly market in existing residential real
estate, in which the federal government has a great stake, and the
need for financial holding or rescue operations in existing construc-
tion may be increased. Thus a balance must be maintained between
federal measures to stimulate new construction and federal measures
to prevent a collapse of the market for old housing.
Finally, a period of declining or low employment would be appro-
priate for reinstituting or expanding a public housing program in-
volving periodic subsidies as well as public financing of capital
It is impossible here to deal with the controversial
aspects of the present program, which evolved from the United
States Housing Act of 1937. There is urgent need for an impartial
study that would lead to such modifications of the program as would
assure more general public support in a period of business decline.
If public housing with federal support is adopted or continued
as a matter of long-run policy, public housing should be an important
element of housing policies to combat a depression (and should be
substantially reduced in scope during periods of high income and
employment). In terms of effectiveness of antidepression measures,
a public housing program would offer several advantages. It would
be unhampered by the uncertainties of consumer and lender reac-
tion to programs involving private credit. It could be so designed
as to minimize competition with markets for other housing construc-
tion or with market segments in need of financial holding or rescue
operations. Consequently there would be minimum "leakages" for
a given amount of public capital expenditures.
6Sincethis paper focuses on federal policies, local real estate taxexemption
on new construction is not considered.
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Stimulation of Repairs and Modernization
Stimulation of expenditures for maintenance, repair, and moderni-
zation should have high priority in programs to combat a depression.
Potentials in this field are large. Decade totals of expenditures for
maintenance, repairs, additions, and alterations in residential real





These percentages are underestimates reflecting substantial under-
statements of repair and modernization expenditures in official sta-
tistics. In a period of declining and uncertain incomes, expendi-
tures of this type probably respond more readily to easy credit than
does new construction. The fact that many houses built during the
postwar period are without garages, porches, and similar facilities
and have structural provisions for additions (such as unfinished at-
tics) adds to the opportunities.
The principal vehicle here is the FHA Title I program for the
insurance of loans for repair and modernization. This program was
perhaps more effective in encouraging construction expenditures
during the middle and late thirties than was the FHA mortgage
insurance program. Its relative importance during recent years has
diminished, but it could be stepped up if the need for such action
should arise. The President's Housing Message of January 1954
recommends larger maximum amounts and longer maturities for
loans under this program. There may be an opportunity also for re-
ducing the maximum interest charges, which are equivalent to an
effective interest rate of 9 to 10 per, cent including the insurance
premium.
In the conventional loan field, lenders could be encouraged, where
circumstances justify, to make additions to existing mortgages at
costs much below those of personal loans and other credit sources
for the financing of modernization and repair. Because of the many
other demands on their funds, financial institutions during the past
few years have given little attention to these possibilities.
Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment
Federal aids for slum clearance and urban redevelopment, al-
ready on the statute books, could be stepped up during a period of
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declining business activity and combined with more vigorous local
enforcement of safety and sanitary codes. The immediate income-
producing effects of this program would probably be small, for
land acquisition involves transfer payments only and, so far as re-
building is concerned, it would be difficult in a depression to find
private sponsors willing or able to proceed with redevelopment.
But the clearance operations themselves would provide employ-
ment; tenant relocation—a great obstacle during periods of full em-
ployment and low vacancies—would be much easier; the costs of
acquiring land and old structures would be lower than during a
boom; and the community 'benefits of slum clearance are large.
Local law enforcement would be an important factor in reducing
costs of land acquisition, for landlords in many instances would
rather board up their properties than invest the funds necessary
to remove violations.
Because an expansion of this program in a period of uncertainty
will probably be handicapped by the difficulties of finding spon-
sors for private redevelopment of cleared areas, means should be
examined of enabling cities to acquire, clear, and hold land even
if actual redevelopment may be delayed for several years.
This difficulty, of course, does not apply to slum clearance for
public improvements such as parks, highways, bridges, tunnels,
public buildings, etc. But such improvements are in a different
category—public works.
Appendix. Additional In formation Needs
Although data have greatly improved in this field, there are few
if any comprehensive series designed to give early warning of trou-
bles and their dimensions. The following items seem vital:
1. Mortgage loan collections. Foreclosure statistics (which do
exist) come too late because foreclosure is the last step in a long
series of events.
2. Continuous local and national vacancy statistics providing data
classified by characteristics of vacant dwelling units.
3. Number and per cent of new houses completed by operative
builders which are left unsold after specified periods—probably
a highly sensitive indicator.
4. Because of the importance of multiple debt obligations of
consumers, Consumer Finance Surveys and simIlar surveys should
be designed to yield better data on concentration of home mortgage
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indebtedness and other indebtedness among certain consumer
groups.
COMMENT
DAvm M. BLANK, Institute for Urban Land Use and Housing
Studies, Columbia University
Grebler mentions the problems created by the close relationship
between the markets for new and existing homes and by the fact
that the stock of homes plays a dominant role in short-term market
fluctuations. Existing homes are, of course, close substitutes for
new homes. Further, the number of new homes built in any year
is always small compared with the size of the existing housing stock.
Over the last half century the ratio of new nonfarm dwelling units
built in each year to the stock of such dwelling units in that year
has averaged between 2 and 3 per cent. Housing construction is
currently running at about 1 million units a year, the highest annual
rate in our history with the exception of 1950; however, the stock
of existing nonfarm dwelling units is well over 40 million.
Visualize, then, the effect on the demand for new construction if
the market for existing structures weakened perceptibly. Thus if
incomes declined merely enough to reduce demand for existing
shelter by as little as 2 per cent, the development of vacancies and
the consequent pressure on real estate prices would probably be
sufficient to offset almost completely current rates of household
formation and to reduce substantially the volume of new construc-
tion. Although the decline in new construction would probably be
somewhat smaller if more favorable credit terms were available on
new homes than on existing homes, it would still be of major pro-
portions. The importance, therefore, of supporting the price and
mortgage structure on existing homes through "financial holding
operations" can be clearly seen.
The relationship between the two markets is, of course, reciprocal.
If new construction is stimulated (e.g. through differential mort-
gage terms) when income and the prices of existing homes are drop-
ping, the additional dwelling units thrown onto the market will
increase the pressure on the market for existing homes. Such a re-
sult not only would go counter to holding operations that the fed-
eral government, would probably be putting into effect at the same
time, but would also have direct repercussions on the government's
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financial position, since it insures or guarantees about 40 .per cent
of the outstanding residential mortgage debt.
The development of housing policies to combat depressions thus
is not a simple problem, and great care will be required to insure
consistency among the housing programs selected to help alleviate
a decline in income and business activity.
Grebler also has pointed out that, despite the fact that the great
bulk of mortgage loans now outstanding are of recent origin and
that federally insured or guaranteed mortgages have provided for
high loan-to-value ratios, more than half of the owner-occupied
homes in the United States were debt-free in 1950 and the median
ratio of debt to value for mortgaged owner-occupied homes was
only 42 per cent. A glance at the distribution of debt-to-value
ratios of mortgaged owner-occupied homes further supports the
view that there is surprising strength in the mortgage debt structure
and that it would take a major decline in real estate prices to place
a significant portion of the debt on the housing stock in jeopardy.
In 1950, 19 out of 20 owners of mortgaged homes had more than 10
per cent equity in their homes; 9 out of 10 had more than 20 per
cent; 4 out of 5 had more than 30 per cent.
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